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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2) (j) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Plaintiff's statement of the issues presented for review 
contains general allegations of error which are disfavored by the 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Utah R. App. P. 9(5). The 
properly framed issues are as follows: 
1. Whether a contract was ever formed between the parties as 
Plaintiff failed to accept Defendant's offer to purchase his cattle 
because the offer required acceptance by performance, and Defendant 
never received the required deposit of $7,2000.00 and a written 
contract? 
2. Whether admissions of preliminary contract negotiations, 
which never resulted in a binding contract, constitute "admissions" 
sufficient to take an oral contract outside the bar of the Statute 
of Frauds? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Because the issues raised here involve the propriety of a 
grant of summary judgment, this Court reviews the decision for 
correctness. See Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 925 P.2d 1270, 1272, 1273 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 
and Stevenson v. Goodson, 924 P. 2d 339, 350 (Utah 1996) . Whether 
there was a contract formed is a question of law which is decided 
by the Court and is reviewed for correctness. Herm Hughes & Sons, 
Inc. v. Ouintek, 834 P.2d 582, 583 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Ann. §70A-2-201 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract 
for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not 
enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is some 
writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has 
been made between the parties and signed by the party against 
whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or 
broker. A writing is not insufficient because it omits or 
incorrectly states a term agreed upon but the contract is not 
enforceable under this paragraph beyond the quantity of goods 
shown in such writing. 
(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in 
confirmation of the contract and sufficient against the sender 
is received and the party receiving it has reason to know its 
contents, it satisfies the requirements of subsection (1) 
against such party unless written notice of objection to its 
contents is given within ten days after it is received. 
(3) A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of 
subsection (1) but which is valid in other respects is 
enforceable 
(a) if the goods are to be specially manufactured for 
the buyer and are not suitable for sale to others in the 
ordinary course of the seller's business and the seller, 
before notice of repudiation is received and under 
circumstances which reasonably indicate that the goods 
are for the buyer, has made either a substantial 
beginning of their manufacture or commitments for their 
procurement; or 
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is sought 
admits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court 
that a contract for sale was made, but the contract is 
not enforceable under this provision beyond the quantity 
of goods admitted; or 
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(c) with respect to goods for which payment has been made 
and accepted or which have been received and accepted 
(section 70A-2-606). 
Utah Code Ann. §70A-2-206 
(1) Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language 
or circumstances 
(a) an offer to make a contract shall be construed as 
inviting acceptance in any manner and by any medium 
reasonable in the circumstances; 
(2) Where the beginning of a requested performance is a 
reasonable mode of acceptance an offeror who is not notified 
of acceptance within a reasonable time may treat the offer as 
having lapsed before acceptance. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves the straightforward review of the trial 
court's application of the Statute of Frauds found in Utah Code 
Ann. §70A-2-201 et.seq. to prevent a party from alleging and 
enforcing an oral "contract" that never came into existence. 
Appellant urges on appeal that there was an oral agreement between 
the parties which was enforceable and admitted by the Defendant in 
an Affidavit. Defendant/Appellee denies there was ever an 
enforceable agreement because Plaintiff failed to properly or 
timely accept it. In addition, Defendant did not admit the 
existence of an enforceable contract based on the policy underlying 
the Statute of Frauds that negotiations which never consummate in 
a contract should not be enforced by Courts. Because the trial 
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court concluded there was no agreement, nor an admission to create 
an exception to the bar of the Statute of Frauds, it dismissed 
Plaintiff's Complaint on a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
1. Plaintiff is a livestock dealer in Uintah County, Utah. 
(Record 1-2, hereinafter referred to as R., Complaint paras. 1, 4.) 
2. Defendant is a livestock owner, who resides in Duchesne 
County. (R. 36, Affidavit of Lance Luck, paras. 1, 2.) 
3. Plaintiff commenced an action against Defendant which 
alleged a breach of an alleged oral contract for the sale of 
cattle. (R. 2, Complaint para. 5.) 
4. Defendant answered the Complaint and raised a number of 
defenses, including that a contract was never formed and that the 
Statute of Frauds barred Plaintiff's alleged breach of contract. 
Specifically, Defendant denied the allegations as to the existence 
of an agreement. The Answer containing the denial reads as 
follows: 
6. Defendant denies that Plaintiff and 
Defendant entered into an agreement as alleged 
in paragraph no. 5 and affirmatively alleges 
that Defendant offered to sell the cattle 
described in paragraph no. 5 to Plaintiff. 
^-Plaintiff's Statement of Facts offers much more than the 
facts, and includes Plaintiff's commentary on and an analysis of 
the "facts." As such, the Statement of Facts is argument and 
should not be relied on by the Court. The facts stated herein are 
undisputed. 
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7. Defendant admits that Plaintiff proposed 
to pay $7,200.00 as a deposit, with the 
balance of the sales price being paid upon the 
completion of the contract, as alleged in 
paragraph no. 6, but denies there was ever a 
promise, an agreement or a contract and 
consequently no payments were made. 
10. Defendant denies that there was an 
agreement to perform as alleged in paragraph 
no. 13 and alleges that no agreement was 
reached in that Plaintiff failed to deliver to 
Defendant any contract or money as an 
acceptance of Defendant's offer to sell 
livestock. 
(R. 23.) 
5. Defendant has not admitted the existence of the contract, 
as alleged in Plaintiff's paraphrased "Statement of Facts." The 
relevant, verbatim statements contained in the Affidavit are as 
follows: 
2. I am a cattle rancher and typically sell 
my cattle once a year at one time. 
3. On or about July 11, 1996, I had a 
telephone conversation with Plaintiff Kim 
Rinderknecht during which I offered to sell 
him 240 head of cattle (steers and heifers). 
The cattle sales price was 58 cents ($0.58) 
per pound for steers and 52 cents ($.52) per 
pound for heifers. 
4. Plaintiff proposed to pay $7,200.00 as a 
deposit, with the balance of the sales price 
being paid upon completion of the contract, or 
the delivery of the cattle. 
5. I never received a deposit check or any 
writing from the Plaintiff relating to the 
sale of the cattle. 
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6. Because Plaintiff did not send the 
deposit check or a contract or any other 
confirming correspondence, I contacted him to 
discuss his intentions. On or about August 1, 
1996, I spoke with Plaintiff who indicated 
that I would probably receive the contract and 
check in the next few days. 
7. Because I had not received a deposit 
check, a contract or any other confirming 
correspondence from Plaintiff on or about 
August 20, 1996, I again called Plaintiff to 
discover whether he wanted to buy the cattle 
or not. I was unable reach Plaintiff. 
8. Since I never received any money, 
contract or other agreement from Plaintiff 
relating to the sale of the cattle. I sold 
the cattle at the Video Auction at the price 
that was being offered at that time. 
(R. 36-37.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The record is absolutely clear that Defendant never accepted 
the offer made by the Plaintiff. Defendant offered to sell the 
cattle in such a way that acceptance was conditioned upon receipt 
of a deposit of $7,200.00, and a written contract. Defendant's 
Affidavit indicates that the offer was made on July 11, 1996, and 
that as of late August, 1996, the time cattle sales are generally 
consummated, the Plaintiff had not accepted the offer because 
Defendant had not received the down payment or a written contract. 
Plaintiff acknowledges in his Affidavit in Opposition to Summary 
Judgment that he received a telephone call from Defendant in which 
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the Defendant informed him that he had not received the check, but 
did nothing to insure that the check was received. 
The record is absolutely clear that Defendant made no 
admission as to the existence of an alleged oral contract. On 
appeal, Plaintiff assumes, and dogmatically insists, that 
Defendant's Affidavit "admits" the existence of a contract. A 
review of the Affidavit belies the truthfulness of that assertion, 
as a matter of law. 
Utah law is abundantly clear that the fact that a party admits 
to pre-contract negotiations does not create a binding contract. 
Indeed, on facts indistinguishable from these in the case at bar, 
the Utah Supreme Court held that the Statute of Frauds bars an 
attempt to enforce pre-contract negotiations, or even an alleged 
oral agreement that is not reduced to writing. See Lish v. 
Compton, 547 P. 2d 223 (Utah 1975) . The Court should apply Utah law 
and ignore factually distinct cases from foreign jurisdictions 
which offer no insight to the issue before this Court. 
Plaintiff's proposed policy would require all Courts to allow 
the trier of fact to determine whether the admission exception to 
the Statute of Frauds exists in any case where the Statute of 
Frauds is raised as a defense, and further defeats the purpose of 
the Statute of Frauds, and the purpose of Summary Judgment. The 
long-standing policy against the enforcement of oral contracts 
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demands that the Court affirm the trial court's conclusion that the 
alleged oral agreement is barred as a matter of law. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE ALLEGED ORAL CONTRACT IS UNENFORCEABLE BECAUSE 
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO ACCEPT DEFENDANTS OFFER TO PURCHASE 
CATTLE AND NEVER PERFORMED AS REQUIRED, 
This is a simple case involving contract formation issues. 
Plaintiff's claim is barred because the parties' negotiations never 
resulted in an enforceable contract. To state it bluntly, 
Plaintiff never accepted the offer extended by the Defendant. 
Utah courts recognize that in cases involving the Uniform 
Commercial Code where an offer is not accepted as required in the 
Code, there is no enforceable contract between the parties. Herm 
Hughes & Sons, Inc. v. Quintek, 834 P. 2d 582 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); 
See also Johnson Tire Serv. Inc. v. Thorn, Inc., 613 P.2d 521 (Utah 
1980) (refusing to enforce part of UCC contract where there was not 
proper acceptance of the offer) . In the Herm Hughes case, the 
Plaintiff, a general contractor, sued the Defendant, a 
subcontractor, seeking to recover the difference between a bid 
price which was offered during on-going negotiations between the 
parties, and the higher price actually paid to another sub-
contractor for furnishing the materials, after negotiations with 
the Defendant broke down. The Court ruled in favor of the 
Defendant, and rejected Plaintiff's claim, ruling that the bid, the 
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offer, was not enforceable as a contract because the Plaintiff had 
not accepted it. 
Utah Code Ann. §70A-2-2 06(2) recognizes that: 
[w]here the beginning of a requested performance is a 
reasonable mode of acceptance an offeror who is not 
notified of acceptance within a reasonable time may treat 
the offer as having lapsed before acceptance. 
In this case, the Affidavit of Defendant expressly indicates 
that his offer made on July 11, 1996, was conditioned upon an 
acceptance of the contract in the form of a down payment of 
$7,200.00 and a written contract, which Defendant never received. 
(R.37, Affidavit of Lance Luck, paras. 4-7.) 
Plaintiff acknowledges in his Affidavit in Opposition to the 
Motion for Summary Judgement that Defendant informed him that he 
had not received the check for a down payment. In spite of that 
knowledge, Plaintiff took no action to insure that the check was 
received. After Defendant had heard nothing from the Plaintiff by 
August 20, 1996, approximately six weeks after the offer was made 
and near the end of the cattle sales season, Defendant sold the 
cattle to another buyer because he correctly concluded that the 
offer had lapsed. Thus, under the admitted facts in the 
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Affidavits, this Court should conclude that there was no acceptance 
of Defendant's offer, and affirm the decision of the trial court.2 
II. UTAH CASE LAW EXPRESSLY PRECLUDES THE ARGUMENT OF THE SO-
CALLED "ADMISSION EXCEPTION" TO THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
RAISED BY THE PLAINTIFF IN THIS CASE. 
Notwithstanding the enormous problem with acceptance of the 
offer in this case, which is not addressed in Plaintiff's brief, 
even under the facts and law as stated by Defendant, the trial 
court's decision was correct. The issue presented by the Plaintiff 
to this Court has been decided by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Defendant's favor in the case of Lish.3 Although Plaintiff refers 
to the Lish case in its brief and attempts to distinguish it, 
Plaintiff's efforts at distinguishing the two cases are decidedly 
unconvincing. Indeed, Defendant suggests that the holding in Lish 
2Plaintiff argued below that Defendant had an undefined 
obligation to contact Plaintiff after August 20, 1996, 
approximately six weeks after the offer was made to sell the 
cattle, and again inform him that he had not received the check and 
contract, which constituted acceptance of the offer. Such a 
position is properly rejected out of hand because it attempts to 
improperly redirect the burden of properly accepting the offer on 
the party who is making the offer. Such a position makes no sense. 
3Plaintiff cites several cases from outside Utah in support of 
his position. Defendant does not believe a tit-for-tat on the 
holdings of these cases will assist the Court in its decision. For 
the most part, Plaintiff has no quarrel with the holdings of the 
cases from outside the state of Utah, as well as the plain language 
of Utah Code Ann. §70A-2-201 (3) (b) , which recognizes that where 
there is an admission as to the existence of a contract, it can act 
as an exception to the statute of frauds. These cases cannot 
change a non-admission into an admission, no matter how many times 
they are quoted. 
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absolutely precludes a good faith argument by Plaintiff that the 
trial court's decision should be overturned on appeal in this case. 
In Lish, the Plaintiff, a grain broker, brought an action 
against a wheat farmer, alleging--as here--breach of a verbal 
contract for the sale of a wheat crop. Interestingly, unlike here, 
the Plaintiff in Lish sent a written confirmation of the sale of 
the wheat approximately two weeks after the conversation in which 
the alleged oral agreement was reached. The Plaintiff sued 
attempting to enforce the alleged agreement. The Defendant in 
Lish, as has Defendant here, raised a defense based on the Statute 
of Frauds. 
In Lish, the trial court allowed the case to go to a jury, who 
answered interrogatories in favor of Plaintiff and determined that 
there was a binding oral contract for the sale of the grain crop. 
The Supreme Court reversed the jury verdict and held, as a matter 
of law, that the Statute of Frauds precluded the Plaintiff from 
recovering on the alleged oral contract. The evidence adduced at 
trial, and which the Supreme Court concluded as a matter of law 
established there was no oral contract, is as follows: 
1. That on August 2, 1973, the Plaintiff Lish 
telephoned the Defendant Compton and talked about the 
purchase of the latter's wheat crop soon to be harvested. 
2. That the price discussed, and which Plaintiff claims 
was agreed upon, was $3.3 0 per bushel for about 15,00 0 
bushels. 
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3. That Plaintiff made a notation of this agreement in 
his notebook on that day and that he committed this same 
15,000 bushels of wheat to the Pillsbury Mills at Ogden 
for $3.45 per bushel, to be delivered upon the harvesting 
of the wheat. 
4. That on August 14, 1973, Plaintiff sent a 
confirmation which was received by Defendant on August 
15, 1973. 
Id. at 223-24. 
In Lish, During examination of the Plaintiff at trial, he 
admitted that had he received a copy of the written confirmation 
sooner than two weeks after the alleged conversation, he would have 
been bound to perform under the contract. Based on that 
"admission," the Plaintiff argued that the Defendant admitted the 
existence of the contract, and could not rely on a Statute of 
Frauds defense. The Supreme Court rejected the argument out of 
hand. The Court stated: 
The provision in the statute that if a party 'admits .... 
in court that a contract for sale was made' simply 
recognizes the obvious, that if he acknowledges a valid 
and binding contract, he should be bound thereby. 
Id. at 226 
In analyzing whether such an admission has been made, the 
court stated that: 
Fairness requires that the Defendant's position be 
ascertained from the total posture of his defense, rather 
than by taking a hypothetical statement from his 
testimony and treating it as a statement of fact. 
Id. at 226 
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Clearly, the "evidence" in the case at bar, which calls into 
question the alleged admission of Defendant, is similar to that in 
Lish which was inadequate as a matter of law. In essence, all the 
Defendant Mr. Luck "admitted" in his Affidavit here is that there 
was a conversation between the parties in which they discussed the 
sale of cattle and the price of the sale, and the conditions of 
such a sale and the means of acceptance--similar to that in the 
Lish case, except the Plaintiff in the Lish case went the 
additional step and sent a document that purported to confirm the 
agreement. Such an admission, if it can be called that, certainly 
does not admit the existence of a valid contract which trumps a 
Statute of Frauds defense. As in Lish, Defendant here would have 
agreed that he would have been bound by the alleged contract, had 
the Plaintiff properly accepted the offer by paying the amount of 
the deposit as consideration. However, because Plaintiff never 
accepted the contract, and gave no consideration, there was nothing 
to enforce. 
In this case, Plaintiff takes the position, to the exclusion 
of all the disclaimers in the Answer, and the Affidavit, that a 
statement regarding contract negotiations and the means of 
acceptance demonstrates the existence of a contract. Stated 
another way, Plaintiff's position is that the fact that Defendant 
admits he and Plaintiff discussed the sale of cattle, and terms of 
13 
the sale, creates a binding contract, even though the contract was 
never accepted and the conditions to create a binding contract were 
never fulfilled. In effect, Plaintiff argues the same hypothetical 
that existed in the Lish case, i.e., that if the parties had 
entered into a written agreement that contained the terms discussed 
in conversation and had Plaintiff properly accepted the terms, 
Defendant would have been bound to them. Who could dispute that 
position, if it were true? However, as is apparent from the 
Affidavits, Defendant never admitted in any form the existence of 
a binding, enforceable contract, or terms that could be construed 
to be a contract. The Affidavit is abundantly clear that all 
Defendant admitted to is that the parties had entered into 
negotiations for the sale of cattle, which were never concluded and 
which did not result in an enforceable contract. When the alleged 
admission is viewed in context, it is difficult to understand how 
this innocuous statement somehow overcomes the time honored 
protections of the Statute of Frauds. The short answer is that it 
cannot. 
III. PLAINTIFFS ATTEMPT TO CREATE A FACTUAL ISSUE FAILS. 
Plaintiff asks this Court, again based on authority from 
foreign jurisdictions, to conclude that in cases involving the so-
called admission exception to the Statute of Frauds defense, a 
trial court can never enter judgment against the party claiming the 
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existence of the contract on a Motion for Summary Judgment. Given 
the fact that no contract was ever formed, or that no admission was 
ever made, the Court need not seriously consider this position. 
Nevertheless, in the spirit of completeness, Defendant will address 
the issue raised. 
The strength of Plaintiff's position is undermined not only by 
the quality of its cited authority, but also by the policy it 
advocates. First, two of the three cases Plaintiff cites in 
support of its position involve Motions to Dismiss filed and 
decided prior to filing an Answer, and not Motions for Summary 
Judgment. Accordingly, the procedural posture of the cases cited, 
and the case at bar, are so completely different that the horrors 
presented in Plaintiff's block quotes are not present in this 
appeal. In this case, Defendant has answered the Complaint and 
presented affidavit evidence that supports its Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Accordingly, the cases involving Motions to Dismiss and 
the policy they advance, simply offer no assistance in deciding 
this case. 
More importantly, Plaintiff's far reaching position would 
preclude trial courts from dismissing cases founded on alleged oral 
contracts based on the Statute of Frauds, without a determination 
of the trier of facts that there were no admissions that might take 
the case outside the bar of the Statute of Frauds. In essence, it 
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would require a trial in every Statute of Frauds case. Utah courts 
have not taken such a far reaching position. The ancient doctrine 
of the Statute of Frauds was created to protect parties from facing 
difficult evidentiary problems created by alleged oral contracts, 
and to prevent parties from "the peril of perjury and error" that 
is "latent in the spoken promise." Ravarino v. Price, 260 P.2d 
570, 578 (Utah 1953) (citing Justice Cardozo in Burns v McCormick, 
233 N.Y. 230, 135 N.E. 273, 274 (1922)). Accordingly, the very 
purpose of the statute is to summarily dispose of fraudulent claims 
of oral contract which are easily fabricated and difficult to 
defeat. The Alabama Supreme Court recognized, in a case similar to 
the case at bar, that the problem created by the "admission 
exception" is that it would make it difficult to summarily dismiss 
cases, like this one, where there is a dispute whether the parties 
ever entered into an oral contract--the very type of case the 
Statute of Frauds was designed to prevent. 
In fact, the controversy in the evidence over the 
agreement indicates the very purpose of the Statute of 
Frauds--to prevent such controversies. If the agreements 
had been in writing, this controversy may never have 
developed." 
Cox v. Cox, 292 Ala. 106, 289 So.2d 609 (1974). 
The Utah Court of Appeals has expressly recognized that where 
the legislature has enacted the Statute of Frauds it is appropriate 
for a trial court to dismiss a case summarily even though there is 
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a factual dispute whether there was an alleged oral agreement 
between the parties. See Wardley Corp Better Homes and Gardens v. 
Burgess, 810 P.2d 476 (Utah 1991).4 In Wardley, the Court 
recognized that the Statute of Frauds placed the risk on certain 
parties if they chose to proceed without a written contract. 
In this case, Plaintiff, a merchant involved in the buying and 
selling of cattle, knew or should have known of the risks of 
proceeding without a written contract. Once Plaintiff elected to 
proceed along a perilous path without a written agreement, in an 
area which is governed by the bar of the Statute of Frauds, he 
should not be allowed to avoid the summary dismissal of the case 
based simply by claiming that there might be an "admission" from 
the Defendant on the stand.5 
4Contrary to the position taken by Plaintiff in his brief, if 
this case were to go to the jury, Defendant would not be allowed to 
present additional evidence about customs and practices in the 
industry or a prior course of conduct. Defendant's own cases 
recognize that if evidence as to the existence of an admission is 
to be decided by the trier of fact, the contract must be 
established through the alleged admission, and not collateral 
evidence. See Dangerfield v. Marvel, 222 N.W.2d 373 (N.D. 1974). 
5Utah courts have routinely held that summary judgment based 
on the statute of frauds is appropriate. See Downtown Athletic 
Club v. Horman, 740 P. 2d 275 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (granting summary 
judgment denying attempt to enforce an alleged oral modification to 
an agreement). 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should sustain the lower court's decision 
dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint as a matter of law. 
DATED this Q.Q> day of September, 1997. 
McKEACHNIE & ALLRED, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
BY 
Gayr$ F. McKeachnie 
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